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Abstract—Distance-bounding protocols serve to thwart various
types of proximity-based attacks, such as relay attacks. A
particular class of distance-bounding protocols measures round
trip times of a series of one-bit challenge-response cycles, during
which the proving party must have minimal computational
overhead. This can be achieved by precomputing the responses
to the various possible challenges. We formalize this class of
precomputation-based distance-bounding protocols. By designing
an abstract model for these protocols, we can study their generic
properties, such as security lower bounds in relation to space
complexity. Further, we present a novel family of protocols in
this class that resists well to mafia fraud attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contactless technologies such as RFID, have become the de
facto solution for many identification/authentication applica-
tions, e.g. access control, ticketing, e-passports. Some access
control mechanisms have been designed in such a way that
physical proximity is enforced easily, e.g., mechanical locks
or biometric identification. However, due to the open nature
of wireless channels, providing the same kind of guarantee in
wireless systems is far from trivial.
Simple proximity enforcing techniques, such as setting up
small communication timeouts or short-range communication
channels, can be easily circumvented in practice by a variety
of attacks [1]. Perhaps, the most popular and devastating of
such attacks is mafia fraud [2], also known as relay attack [3].
The most reliable countermeasure against these type of
attacks is distance-bounding (DB) which typically consists in
measuring the Round Trip Time (RTT) of a message exchange.
Amongst more than 30 DB protocols proposed1 so far, we can
find a large class (e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]) whose members
follow two core principles raised by Hancke and Kuhn in [3]:
• RTT measurements should exchange single-bit messages.
• Each RTT measurement ought to be based on a challenge-
response authentication scheme so that, even if the proto-
col stops after a few RTT measurements, some guarantees
of proximity can be provided.
Distance-bounding protocols adhering to these principles
normally consist of two phases. The first phase is called the
slow phase, where the verifier and the prover exchange nonces
and use a shared key to secretly precompute a lookup table
with potential responses for the next phase. The second phase,
known as fast phase, consists of n RTT measurements (often
1http://www.avoine.net/rfid/index.php
called rounds). At the ith round, the verifier sends a random
bit-challenge ci to the prover and starts a clock. The prover
replies instantly to the challenge ci by using the precomputed
lookup table. Upon reception of the prover’s reply, the verifier
stops the clock and computes the RTT. The protocol finishes
correctly if all responses are correct and all RTTs are lower
than a predefined threshold.
Because all protocols based on these principles have a
similar shape, it would be natural and useful to consider them
as instantiations of the same protocol scheme, with slight
variations. That would provide us with a mathematical model,
allowing us to study theoretical properties that hold for a large
class of protocols. We have called them precomputation-based
distance-bounding protocols.
II. PRECOMPUTATION-BASED DISTANCE-BOUNDING
PROTOCOLS
In [3] the authors explain the advantage of avoiding a final
slow phase, even at the cost of an apparent decrease in the
resistance to mafia fraud. In terms of execution time and
computational complexity, the cost of executing a couple of
additional rounds during the fast phase is significantly lower
than the cost of performing expensive cryptographic operations
and message exchanges over a traditional communication
channel.
Precomputation-based protocols are distance-bounding pro-
tocols without a final slow phase where all possible responses
to the verifier’s challenges are precomputed in the initial slow
phase. These responses are stored in memory such that query
time should be minimum. The authentication is carried on
during the fast phase. Because of the time measurement, the
operations have to be as low cost as possible, e.g., accessing
to random access memory, simple bit operations.
We sketch a simple model that captures a prominent class
of DB protocols based on precomputation. The approach uses
a particular class of Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA)
with labels attached to states. We consider a protocol as a
set of DFA, where each automaton describes the protocol’s
behaviour in the fast phase. The structure and labeling of such
automaton follows from the calculations in the slow phase,
in which, e.g., the nonces are chosen. Consequently, every
possible outcome of the slow phase results in an automaton.
The execution of a protocol therefore consists of the (ran-
dom) selection of one automaton (in the slow phase) and
a run (fast phase) consisting of a n-steps walk through the
automaton, i.e. an alternation of input and output symbols, that
represent challenges and responses, respectively. We remind
that n stands for the number of rounds.
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Fig. 1. An automaton example
In Figure 1 we depict an au-
tomaton example for the HK pro-
tocol [3] for 3 rounds. The states
{0, 1, . . . , 6} are linked by tran-
sitions represented by the arrows.
The states have binary labels at-
tached, shown to their left and
right. We have shown also an ex-
ecution with the challenges 100
–in blue– whose corresponding
responses –in red– are 101.
The proposed model captures
several state-of-the-art DB protocols, such as [3], [4], [5], [8].
The virtue of this model is that it supports generic analysis of
members of this protocol class. For instance, we can analyze
the security limits of a protocol in relation to the number of
rounds.
III. PROPERTIES AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In 2009, Avoine and Tchamakerten proposed the tree-based
protocol [5], whose security against mafia fraud is 12n (1+
n
2 ),
where n is the number time measurements. Since then, that
value has become a de facto lower bound on the resistance to
this type of attacks.
Supported in our model, we have proved that, for any
precomputation-based distance-bounding protocol, there exists
an attack that succeeds with such a probability. This demon-
strates that 12n (1 +
n
2 ) is a tight lower bound on the security
of this type of protocols against mafia fraud. Based on this
result, we introduce the concept of optimality that stands for a
precomputation-based distance-bounding protocol for which,
there does not exist a mafia fraud attack whose probability of
success is higher than the above-mentioned value.
In that sense, the model allows to analyze the relation
memory-optimality given that the required memory is mea-
surable according to the number of states of the largest
possible automaton in the protocol. It is worth remarking
tree-based approach is the only optimal protocol proposed so
far. However, it requires an exponential amount of states and
consequently the memory complexity becomes exponential.
We also describe a subclass within the precomputation-
based distance-bounding protocols, whose members are lay-
ered and random-labeled. A brief description of these two
properties is as follows:
• A protocol is layered if for every automaton, two input
sequences of different length reach different states.
• A protocol is random-labeled if for a random automaton
and a random state in it, the probability of being labeled
with any input symbol is the same.
To evaluate the resistance of a DB protocol against mafia
fraud usually two strategies are considered: pre-ask and post-
ask [9], although the latter is not relevant in protocols without
a final slow phase [9]. A pre-ask strategy can be summarized
as follows: the adversary relays the first slow phase between
the verifier and the prover. Then –before the verifier starts the
fast phase– it executes the fast phase with the prover, retrieving
some information on possible responses (often called pre-ask
session). Afterward, the attacker performs the fast phase with
the legitimate verifier.
In the context of layered and random-labeled protocols, we
proved that the best pre-ask strategy for the adversary is simply
to reply to the verifier with the responses obtained from the
prover in the pre-ask session. We state that HK and tree-based
protocols are both within this subclass whereas the Poulidor
protocol [4] is not.
Finally, we propose a family of layered and random-labeled
protocols, called uniform protocols, whose members have a
security level arbitrarily close to the optimal value 12n (1+
n
2 ).
The use of memory of these protocols are considerable lower
than the exponential one required by the tree-based approach.
IV. FUTURE WORK
As future work, we will study security of precomputation-
based distance-bounding protocols against other types of at-
tack, e.g. distance fraud and terrorist fraud. We will also
analyze deeply the relation optimality-memory. Our hypoth-
esis is that optimality implies exponential amount of states.
Further, for a given upper-bound on the number of states (i.e.
available memory), we want to find the best precomputation-
based distance-bounding protocol. In addition, we will study
the security in non-layered precomputation-based distance-
bounding protocols, e.g. Poulidor protocol [4].
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